1. DIE GEISTER, DIE MAN RIEF…
„… Immer wenn das Regime Mubarak in der Ecke stand, brannte als Ablenkungsmanöver irgendwo im Land eine Kirche. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass die Staatssicherheit wieder mit den altbewährten Methoden arbeitet, schließlich sind es immer noch die gleichen Staatssicherheitsoffiziere. …“
2. ZUR VERBINDUNG ZWISCHEN MUSLIMBRUDERSCHAFT UND (GLOBALEM) TERRORISMUS / ON THE LINKS BETWEEN BROTHERHOOD AND (GLOBAL) TERRORISM
„…After the military intervention, however, a new frame was introduced: the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists.
The Muslim Brotherhood have long been portrayed as a sinister, secretive and radical organization intent on co-opting power in order to establish an Islamic state (locally) and an Islamic caliphate (globally). For decades, these assumptions have ground the terrorism discourse reproduced by different Egyptian regimes, and constitute a powerful narrative in the public imagination.
In particular, the continual link made between the MB and violence cannot be underestimated. This fits into global discourse on Islamism, which is regularly portrayed as an overly and irrationally violent movement. Islamists are painted as exclusionary and so dangerous they cannot be negotiated with…“
3. ZUM UNTERSCHIED ZWISCHEN JAN 25 2011 UND JUN 30 2013
„… Context is everything. To understand where we are at the moment, we need to understand why people took to the street. It is also vital that we understand the differences between January 25, 2011, June 30, 2013 and protests in support of ousted president Mohamed Morsi. …“
4. ZUR SITUATION DER AUßENPOLITISCHEN ABHÄNGIGKEIT ÄGYPTENS / ON THE DEPENDENCE OF EGYPT ON FOREIGN PARTNERS
„…The only powers that might mourn Morsi’s departure are both consumed by domestic issues right now: in Qatar, a leadership transition between the emir and his son and in Turkey, a not-dissimilar resentment over the leading Islamist party’s broken promises and street brutality. And compared to Saudi Arabia and Israel, both of which welcome the development, neither is truly significant. That leaves the US in a very difficult situation, especially in light of the arrests and media bans now being enacted against Islamists and calls to recognize what has occurred this past week as a coup, which would put military aid to Egypt under review and then, suspension.
Closer to events on the ground, Israel is not unhappy to see Morsi go, and will probably refrain from making loud noises about his departure (unlike Mubarak’s departure). The deep state of the military, foreign ministry, and GIS have maintained professional and personal relationships far deeper than the „formal“ diplomatic and economic ties the two countries have, and is already beingcited by US commentators as justification to not link the Army’s actions today to the US$1.3 billion aid payments. And finally, while Hamas has nothing to gain from this turn – indeed, things seem to be getting worse for Gaza already – it was hardly gaining anything from Egypt at present, given Morsi’s own crackdown on smuggling and order for Gaza’s tunnels to be flooded with sewerage. What chance that extended Islamist rule might move Egypt towards closer collaboration with Qatar and Turkey on Gaza by replacing the old guard in the Egyptian bureaucracy is now surely dashed for the movement. …“